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Abstract
The debate concerning reforms in sovereign debt restructuring (SDR) ranges 
from those which maximize flexibility (e.g. adoption of clauses in debt contracts) to 
those which maximize uniformity and predictability (e.g. enacting a fixed frame-
work similar to a domestic bankruptcy regime). This paper proposes that the prin-
ciples of SDR in the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 69/319 be broadly 
codified into a treaty. This includes the principle of sustainability which emphasizes 
“inclusive growth and sustainable development” of stakeholders in SDR. In the 
current unsystematized regime of SDR, this proposal seeks to bridge the value of 
flexibility in ex post negotiations and the values of uniformity and predictability in 
ex ante rules under fixed bankruptcy regimes.
Keywords: sovereign debt, bankruptcy, sustainability, inclusive growth, reform, 
resolution, restructuring
1. Introduction
The challenge of resolving a sovereign debt crisis becomes problematic when it 
has international dimensions. A State with purely domestic indebtedness has the 
flexibility to enact measures to address a debt problem that is entirely within its 
jurisdiction. It can, for example, enact laws that reduce the face value of its debts or 
lengthen their maturities to prevent the possibility of default. In this case, the State’s 
creditors would normally be without any recourse because debt contracts are cre-
ated, operationalized and sustained within the legal framework of the Debtor State.
Thus, the restructuring measure enacted by the State to preserve its fiscal health 
and the general well-being of the country would prevail over the creditors’ rights to 
receive the “full value” of the debt. In short, a purely domestic sovereign debt would 
permit unilateral restructuring by the Debtor State. In the positivistic language of 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, “there can be no legal right as against the authority 
that makes the law on which the right depends…” [1]. In economic terms, however, 
the creditors’ lack of legal recourse is effectively part of sharing the burden (like 
everyone else) to address the collective problem of a sovereign debt crisis.
Once sovereign debt has international dimensions, the Debtor State has to con-
tend with legal systems other than its own. Access to international debt markets 
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made the resolution of sovereign debt crises an international affair. For their 
protection, creditors often demand that debt contracts contain provisions that 
introduce elements of foreign legal systems to them—e.g. provisions on govern-
ing law and the choice of a tribunal other than the domestic courts of the Debtor 
State. As in the Argentinian crisis that started in the early 2000s, Argentina had to 
contend with creditor holdouts carrying injunctions secured from New York courts 
(see generally [2]).
Thus, in the case of sovereign debt crises with international dimensions, their 
resolution involves the interaction between at least two legal systems. The protec-
tion given by a foreign legal system has a deterrent effect on unilateral debt restruc-
turing by the concerned State. However, this situation also creates the opportunity 
for delays and holdout behavior by giving creditors protection contractually drawn 
from a legal system outside that of the Debtor State. This becomes a collective 
action problem that ultimately hinders the resolution of a sovereign debt crisis. The 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) has long acknowledged that “While private 
creditors as a group may recognize that support for rapid restructuring is in their 
own interest, they may hesitate to agree to a restructuring out of concern that other 
creditors may hold out and press for full payment on the original terms after the 
agreement has been reached” ([3], p. 12).
Proposals for a collective and multilateral proceeding for the resolution of sover-
eign debt crises have been fairly widespread in the literature (see [4], p. 87). These 
proposals usually draw from domestic bankruptcy rules which, among others, support 
a global stay on debt collection efforts, the application of the automatic acceleration 
principle, priority rules and variants of creditor equality treatments [4, 5]. However, 
the resolution of a sovereign debt crisis would not be as simple as, to paraphrase 
the legal positivist H.L.A. Hart, a “bankruptcy regime writ large.”1 [6, 7]. There are 
significant characteristics of sovereign debt restructuring (SDR) that are not found in 
domestic bankruptcy regimes such as the non-availability of an option to liquidate the 
Debtor State and the critical role of macroeconomic policy and economic growth in the 
restructuring process.
Given that the current resolution efforts primarily occur within a conflict of law 
regime, this paper argues that a minimum level of multilateralization is needed to 
universalize broad norms that channel collective behavior during a sovereign debt 
crisis. These norms should consider “inclusive economic growth and sustainable 
development” within the Debtor State as rational and viable strategy in SDR.
More concretely, this paper proposes that efforts should be exerted so that the 
principles of sovereignty, good faith, transparency, impartiality, equitable treat-
ment, sovereign immunity, legitimacy, majority structuring and sustainability 
under the United Nations (UN) General Assembly Resolution 69/319 adopted on 
10 September 2015 (“Basic Principles on Sovereign Debt Restructuring Processes”) 
may be broadly codified into a treaty. Such codification may include changes in the 
articulation of these principles to accommodate the positions of States such as those 
in the European Union (EU) (see [8]). Significantly, the principle of sustainability 
should emphasize the concept of “inclusive growth and sustainable development” 
within the Debtor State as part of the SDR framework. This proposal is being made 
in the context of the lack of support from countries which have the “major financial 
centers from which most of the sovereign debt has been issued” ([9], p. 47).
While certainly not an easy feat, the foregoing follows the so-called Incremental 
Approach that “complement, rather than replace, existing mechanisms, including 
contractual approaches and the activities of the International Financial Institutions 
1 In criticizing John Austin’s Command Theory of law, H.L.A. Hart described it as a “gunman situation 
writ large.”
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or the Paris Club, and guide their operation” ([10], p. 38). The thrust of this 
proposal is to broadly formalize the norms in UN General Assembly Resolution 
69/319 that would give States the flexibility to negotiate and adopt specific measures 
in resolving a sovereign debt crisis. As such, this would not involve an unqualified 
“surrender of sovereignty” which has been part of the reason for States’ reluctance 
to enter into a “hard law” approach in SDR.
In what follows, Part II of this essay describes the current conflicts of law regime 
where SDR occurs. Part III sets out the proposal to codify the principles embodied 
in UN General Assembly Resolution 69/319 into a treaty. Part IV discusses the 
principle of sustainability which emphasizes the concept of “inclusive growth 
and sustainable development” as a rational and viable strategy of SDR. Part V 
concludes.
2. The conflict of law regime of sovereign debt restructuring
The international dimension of SDR does not arise primarily from international 
law as set out in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, but 
by contractual provisions that incorporate laws other than the legal system of the 
Debtor State. In general, there are no “top-down” international norms that govern 
SDR in the form of treaties, custom or principles. Instead, there is a “bottom-up” 
normative system that arises from the number of debt contracts issued by Debtor 
States that contain provisions which introduce elements of a foreign legal system 
to them. While there are international laws that may apply to SDR such as the 
principle of sovereign immunity or the Hague Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments [11], these international norms are limited to 
the extent that they do not dictate how SDR is implemented as a whole.
The legal environment where SDR presently operates is a regime of “conflict of 
laws” or “private international law.” Conflict of laws does not principally concern 
itself with international law. Rather, it is the application of domestic law whenever a 
particular jurisdiction is “faced with a claim that contains a foreign element” ([12], 
p. 2). In other words, a conflict of law approach does not depend on the application 
of international law among States. Instead, it entails the operation of a particular 
domestic law in cases involving the interaction between at least two legal systems. 
Thus, “[t]he raison d’être of private international law is the existence in the world of 
a number of separate municipal systems of law—a number of separate legal units—
that differ…from each other in the rules by which they regulate the various legal 
relations arising in daily life” ([12], p. 4).
As in the current regime of SDR, the rules that generally govern SDR are strictly 
not international law, but a State’s domestic rules that apply when foreign laws 
that are incorporated in a debt contracts. The practice of SDR is therefore situated 
within a conflict of laws regime which recognizes that while a State may enact rules 
in the treatment of foreign laws, “[a] sovereign is supreme within [its] own terri-
tory…[It] can, if [it] chooses, refuse to consider any law but [its] own” ([12], p. 4). 
As discussed below, while the principle of State sovereignty is conceded in theory, 
its practical application in SDR is qualified by the set of debt contracts that a State 
has entered into in accessing capital.
The provisions that are often stipulated to introduce elements of a foreign legal 
system in debt contracts are (a) dispute settlement clauses that confer jurisdiction 
to a tribunal other than the domestic courts of the Debtor State; and (b) govern-
ing law clauses (see [13]). Incidentally, these contractual provisions mirror the 
scope of private international law which is “always concerned one or more of three 
questions, namely,” (a) the jurisdiction of the domestic court; (b) recognition and 
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enforcement of foreign judgments; and (c) the choice of law ([12], p. 7). Governing 
law clauses in a debt instrument may include the specific choice of law provision 
designating, for instance, New York or English or Japanese Law; or a provision that 
references an international norm such as a particular treaty or the principle of State 
sovereignty. Moreover, the adjudicatory body constituted by the debt instrument 
applies the choice of law or the referenced international norm pursuant to the 
contract.
During a sovereign debt crisis, the Debtor State may unilaterally restructure its 
debts pursuant to its sovereign right to set its own macroeconomic policy. In this 
context, foreign creditors demand that such clauses be contained in debt instru-
ments to effectively act as restraints against unilateral restructuring by a Debtor 
State. These clauses therefore imply a waiver of the Debtor State’s sovereignty. By 
introducing elements of foreign laws in debt instruments, these clauses “interna-
tionalize” what would otherwise be purely domestic contracts that may be amended 
by the Debtor State. It has been said that “[m]any countries do not regard foreign 
creditors with great sympathy, especially when the country is bankrupt and the 
citizens are throwing stones in the street” ([13], p. 4). Thus, for instance, New York 
or English Law “continue to dominate sovereign and quasi-sovereign lending in 
large parts of the world[,] including many emerging markets” [14]. New York and 
English Law are often the choices of law in debt instruments because of their “insu-
lating effect” against “legislative changes in the borrower’s country” ([13], p. 4). It 
is also a factor that the United States and the United Kingdom are often the home 
States of creditors who hold sovereign bonds. On the other hand, Debtor States 
normally agree to these clauses in order to access capital from foreign creditors.
The present regime of SDR has also been described as “contractual” given that 
debt contracts are the primary sources of rights and obligations with respect to 
sovereign debt. In the case of purely domestic indebtedness, a State has wide leeway 
in dealing with its debts using its own legal system. However, when a State borrows 
capital from foreign markets, debt contracts trigger the interaction between two 
legal systems and, to a more limited extent, between the Debtor State’s legal system 
and international law. This precisely characterizes a conflict of law regime which 
is principally concerned with the “existence in the world of a number of separate 
municipal systems of law” ([12], p. 4). As a consequence, without an overarching 
framework, SDR is necessarily based on the Debtor State’s ad hoc negotiations with 
its creditors based on those contracts. The ad hoc nature of these negotiations is 
reinforced by the fact that the distressed Debtor State has to deal with a diverse set 
of creditors including hedge funds and institutional investors.
Thus, the myriad of sovereign debt contracts is the core operational legal frame-
work in the resolution of a sovereign debt crisis. The application of the international 
principle of State sovereignty is, to a large extent, determined through the State’s 
express and implied waivers of such principle contained in the debt contracts. 
In most cases, international law is applied in SDR if it is incorporated in these 
contracts. While sovereign debt contracts may be covered by an investment treaty 
as in Abaclat v. Argentina [15], this has not evolved into a consistent international 
norm in SDR. In the first place, whether debt contracts are considered protected 
under an investment treaty would depend on the specific definition of “invest-
ment” under such treaty. Second, such expansive interpretation of “investment” has 
been criticized as a departure from the common understanding of “investment” as 
long-term commitment of capital that contributes to the economic development of 
the host State (see [16], pp. 515–517). In any event, there are currently more than 
3000 investment treaties in the world with varying definitions of investment [17]. 
This situation in international investment law is hardly one that reflects a consistent 
international norm in SDR.
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According to Guzman and Stiglitz, the contractual regime of SDR is essentially a 
“non-system…characterized by bargaining based on decentralized and non-binding 
market-based instruments centered on collective action clauses and compet-
ing codes of conduct” ([18], p. 3). There is widespread literature which strongly 
criticizes this contractual regime as “disorderly, inefficient, and overly costly” 
especially with respect to creditor collective action problems, in particular debt 
runs, holdouts and litigation (Citations omitted. [14], p. 88). Thus, there have been 
calls for a “hard law” approach or a multilateral legal framework to address these 
problems (for an overview, see [14], pp. 87–96). On the other hand, there are those 
skeptical of these proposals because of fears of rigidity of rules and “regulatory 
overkill” ([14], p. 88). Thus, an ex ante SDR framework consisting of mandatory 
rules carries the risk of stifling the flexibility that is present in ex post negotiations. 
Thus, “[i]nstead of creating a statutory framework ‘top-down,’ it could suffice to 
alter the documentation of bond and loan contracts to regulate the restructuring 
process in a more efficient way” ([14], p. 88). This would be the contractual regime 
of SDR where the prevailing norms of conduct are based on the terms and condi-
tions stipulated in contracts entered into by the parties.
As discussed below, one way to bridge these opposing views is to formalize 
norms that are broad enough to allow parties the flexibility to adopt certain mea-
sures in the resolution of sovereign debt crises. At the same time, the formaliza-
tion of these norms should be effective enough to influence collective behavior in 
SDR. The next part will discuss this proposal through a treaty-based codification of 
the norms contained in UN General Assembly Resolution 69/319.
3. Establishing a treaty-based normative framework
When UN General Assembly Resolution 69/319 (“Basic Principles on Sovereign 
Debt Restructuring Processes”) was adopted 10 September 2015, 136 States voted 
in favor, six States voted against, and 41 States abstained ([18], p. 4; [10], p. 37). 
Among those which opposed the resolution were the US and the UK, “the two 
major jurisdictions for sovereign debt issuances by emerging economies, as well as 
Canada, Germany, Israel and Japan” ([18], p. 4).
UN General Assembly Resolution 69/319 articulates nine principles in SDR:
1. The principle of State sovereignty which is the Debtor State’s right “to design its 
macroeconomic policy, including restructuring its sovereign debt…”
2. Good faith which is the “engagement in a constructive sovereign debt restruc-
turing workout negotiations and other stages…”
3. Transparency which is “accountability of the actors concerned…”
4. Impartiality which means “independence” and the prevention of “undue influ-
ence” and “conflicts of interest.”
5. Equitable treatment which is a State duty to refrain from arbitrary discrimina-
tion among its creditors.
6. Sovereign immunity of States from jurisdiction and execution which includes 
courts’ obligation to “restrictively interpret” it in favor of State immunity.
7. Legitimacy entails “inclusiveness and the rule of law” in SDR “at all levels.”
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8. Sustainability “implies that sovereign debt restructuring workouts are com-
pleted in a timely and efficient manner and lead to a stable debt situation in the 
debtor State…”
9. Majority restructuring “implies that sovereign debt restructuring agreements 
that are approved by a qualified majority of the creditors of a State are not to 
be…impeded by other States or a non-representative minority of creditors…”
The thrust of this paper’s proposal to codify UN General Assembly Resolution 
69/319 into a treaty is to formalize the foregoing principles without necessarily 
adopting the resolution in toto. Its main objective is to introduce these norms as 
a multilateral framework in SDR without, at the moment, imposing any specific 
measure to implement them. If the voting of UN General Assembly Resolution 
69/319 is any indication, only the 136 States which voted in favor of the resolution 
would probably regard its codification in a positive light. Thus, to improve chances 
of success, a proposal for codification should court the “no” and “abstain” votes by 
introducing changes that accommodate their positions.
It is not surprising that the influential developed economies voted against UN 
General Assembly Resolution 69/319 given that their citizens are mostly the credi-
tors of distressed Debtor States and that they have an interest in protecting the 
sovereign debt market within their jurisdictions. One of their declared principal 
objections is that “the IMF as the primary forum to discuss sovereign debt restruc-
turing issues” instead of the UN General Assembly [8]. Equally important are their 
objections against the specific manner by which the nine principles in SDR were 
articulated in the resolution.
The European Union, for instance, has declared its objections to a number of 
statements in the resolution:
Paragraph 4 requests “all institutions and actors involved in sovereign debt 
restructuring,” including “at regional level,” to “refrain from exercising any undue 
influence over the process and other stakeholders or engaging in actions that would 
give rise to conflicts of interest.” Such a statement fits poorly with both the EU 
institutional setting and its practical situation, where possible discussions related to 
the stock of debt of a Member State take place primarily at regional level, against 
a background in which the Member States themselves are often the main creditors 
(directly or via the financial assistance mechanisms that they have established).
Paragraph 5 states that “creditors have the right to receive the same proportionate 
treatment in accordance with their credit and its characteristics” and that “no 
creditors or creditor groups should be excluded ex ante from the sovereign debt 
restructuring process.” Such a statement denies the customary preferred creditor 
status recognized to the International Financial Institutions (IMF, ESM...) when 
lending to a Sovereign in distress, with possible major negative implications on their 
ability to fulfill their primary mission.
Paragraph 9 states that “sovereign debt restructuring agreements that are approved by 
a qualified majority of the creditors of a State are not to be affected, jeopardized or oth-
erwise impeded by other States.” This statement is very problematic for issuances under 
foreign jurisdiction (the overwhelmingly dominant case for developing and emerging 
countries). Issuing under a foreign jurisdiction does, by definition, involve accepting the 
competence of the courts of another State. This is a point of major importance for the 
EU, as a very large part of the world’s sovereign issuances under foreign jurisdiction are 
made under the jurisdiction of one of its Member States (UK) [19].
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In codifying the SDR principles into a treaty, it is worthwhile to consider these 
objections which relate to the specific wording of UN General Assembly Resolution 
69/319. In general, it is easier to accommodate concerns about specific wordings 
than the more fundamental objections premised on the market-based approach to 
SDR. This is driven by a pragmatic consideration of securing State support by post-
poning the imposition of concrete SDR measures and, at the same time, advancing 
the main objective of introducing a multilateral normative framework for SDR.
The broad codification of the norms contained in UN General Assembly 
Resolution 69/319 would be a compromise between a “soft law” approach (usu-
ally in the form of guidelines that may be adopted by States) and a “hard law” 
approach in the form of enforceable specific SDR measures. While the proposal 
takes the form of a treaty, the SDR norms to be articulated therein should be 
deliberately broad to give States the flexibility to implement them within specific 
contexts. As such, this would not be an unqualified “surrender of sovereignty” on 
the part of State parties that may be part of their reluctance towards UN General 
Assembly Resolution 69/319 (consider, for instance, the 41 abstaining votes). A 
degree of flexibility is needed in SDR especially in view of the rapidly changing 
nature of the sovereign debt market (see generally [20]).
This proposal is preliminary: it is designed to set the grounds for more concrete 
and “hard law” SDR measures in the future. It follows the so-called Incremental 
Approach that “complement, rather than replace, existing mechanisms, including 
contractual approaches and the activities of the International Financial Institutions 
or the Paris Club, and guide their operation” ([10], p. 38). Despite not codifying 
concrete SDR measures, a treaty-based multilateral normative framework would 
hopefully exert a “compliance pull” on the current SDR regime towards a shared 
understanding of these norms. A multilateral normative framework in SDR would 
reinforce the “use [of] the interpretive space between the factual and the norma-
tive, between apology and utopia, in order to highlight and strengthen trends in 
current practice that support debt sustainability” ([10], pp. 38–39).
The broad codification of the norms in UN General Assembly Resolution 69/319 
would be a significant advancement in itself towards establishing a multilateral 
normative framework in SDR. Even from the perspective of market-based propo-
nents, the efficiency and equity problems in the present regime of SDR is serious 
enough to warrant reform. It is the kind of reforms needed that is the subject of 
intense debate which straddles between, on one hand, the value of uniform and pre-
determined rules and, on the other, that of flexibility. This paper’s proposal seeks to 
bridge those values by supporting a predetermined normative framework in SDR 
while retaining the flexibility needed to undertake the restructuring process.
As a political matter, there is no doubt that the support of influential developed 
countries like the US and the UK would considerably help the success of the pro-
posed treaty. However, even if there are limited States which become parties to the 
treaty, it cannot be discounted that some actors might prefer to deal with States with 
a reasonably predictable SDR framework as forwarded by the proposal.
A treaty-based normative framework in SDR would also mean that domestic 
courts of State parties would be obligated to apply the norms embodied in the 
treaty. Howse observes that even with international arbitration, “domestic courts 
are the ultimate mechanism [in SDR], as is illustrated by international investment 
law.” ([21], p. 244). This is because it is often the case that most of the Debtor State’s 
assets are located within its jurisdiction. Moreover, it is not unlikely for treaty-based 
SDR norms to influence international arbitration (based on debt contracts) given 
that State parties to the arbitration now have a treaty obligation to follow the SDR 
norms. Thus, while treaty-based SDR norms are deliberately broad, there will be 
some measure of enforcement of those norms especially at the domestic level.
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In sum, this treaty-based normative framework in SDR may set the course for a series 
of actions which may lead to more concrete and enforceable measures in SDR. This is 
the import of the Incremental Approach that “highlight[s] and strengthen[s] trends in 
current [and future] practice” ([10], p. 38) and which is designed to continuously build 
upon the broad normative framework set out at the start.
4. The principle of sustainability
The principles or norms provided in UN General Assembly Resolution 69/319 
may be seen as addressing two aspects of SDR: first is the conduct of the relevant 
actors in the restructuring process; and second is the objective of the restructuring 
process itself. The principles of sovereignty, good faith, transparency, impartiality, 
equitable treatment, sovereign immunity, legitimacy and majority structuring pri-
marily relate to the behavior of States, creditors, tribunals and other relevant actors. 
These principles are meant to address the collective action problem in SDR—that is, 
the failure to coordinate among the Debtor State and its creditors even if all would 
be better off if they coordinate.
For instance, the end of Argentina’s 15-year stand-off with the majority of its 
holdout creditors in April 2016 has been attributed to “good faith negotiations” 
([22], p. 1). In lifting the injunction against Argentina’s payment of its restructured 
bonds, the New York court judgment “indicated…that the election of Argentina’s 
new government with its willingness to negotiate in good faith…was pivotal in [the] 
decision…” ([22], p. 2; [23]). In this case, “good faith” was used to characterize the 
conduct of negotiations between Argentina and its holdout creditors in reaching a 
settlement that allowed the recovery of 75% of the creditors’ original claim. This 
would be an example of an application of the principle of good faith to address a 
collective action problem in SDR. Moreover, the principles of sovereignty, trans-
parency, impartiality, equitable treatment, sovereign immunity, legitimacy and 
majority structuring would have, in varying degrees, played a part in reaching the 
Argentine settlement as it is often necessary that these principles operate in concert 
to address a collective action problem.
On the other hand, the principle of sustainability would relate more to the 
objective of SDR. Guzman and Stiglitz, for instance, stated that “[t]he ultimate 
goal of sovereign debt restructuring is to restore the sustainability of public debt 
with high probability” ([18], p. 3). The articulation of the principle of sustain-
ability in UN General Assembly Resolution 69/319, however, is noteworthy for its 
progressiveness:
Sustainability implies that sovereign debt restructuring workouts are completed in a 
timely and efficient manner and lead to a stable debt situation in the debtor State, 
preserving at the outset creditors’ rights while promoting sustained and inclusive economic 
growth and sustainable development, minimizing economic and social costs, warranting 
the stability of the international financial system and respecting human rights.
The foregoing is not only concerned with the debt sustainability within the 
Debtor State, but also “inclusive economic growth and sustainable development…
[which] respect[] human rights.” This particular articulation is holistic in the sense 
that it considers the long-term social and economic welfare of the Debtor State 
which may very include the well-being of its citizens. Significantly, the mention 
of “human rights” may make SDR resonate with other international norms such 
as those embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights [24] and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [25].
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The IMF has defined debt sustainability “as a situation in which a borrower is 
expected to be able to continue servicing its debts without an unrealistically large 
future correction to the balance of income and expenditure” ([26], p. 4). Compared 
to the UN General Assembly Resolution 69/319, the IMF’s definition of “debt 
sustainability” has been described as being “in purely financial terms” ([10], p. 25).
The IMF’s definition consists of two components: (1) that the Debtor State “can-
not indefinitely accumulate debt faster than [its] capacity to service these debts” 
([14], p. 71); and (2) that the service of debts should not require “an unrealistically 
large future correction to the balance of income and expenditure.” The first relates 
to a financial aspect of sustainability whose objective is to prevent an unbounded 
accumulation of debts. On the other hand, the second component “implies that 
there are social and political limits to adjustment[s]” ([14], p. 71) needed to achieve 
debt sustainability. Thus, “[n]ot all fiscal adjustment paths are realistic, because 
political and other constraints will influence a country’s willingness to pay (as 
opposed to ability to pay)” ([14], p. 71).
The recognition by the IMF of social and political limits to adjustment policies 
in SDR may be seen as going beyond a purely financial framework of sustainability. 
Although this recognition may be limited insofar as it affects a State’s willingness 
to pay its debts, the IMF’s definition is significant to the extent that it implies an 
assessment of the social and political situation of the debtor State in the context of 
a sovereign debt crisis. Thus, it may not be entirely accurate to say that the IMF’s 
definition of “debt sustainability” is incompatible with the principle of sustainabil-
ity in UN General Assembly Resolution 69/319. The IMF’s willingness to recognize 
the social and political aspects of SDR has some kinship with UN General Assembly 
Resolution 69/319 in its emphasis on “inclusive economic growth and sustain-
able development.” In fact, recent debt sustainability analysis of the IMF factors 
economic growth within the Debtor State as a contributing variable in assessing 
sustainability ([14], p. 75).
In short, there may be possible points of contact between the IMF’s definition 
of “debt sustainability” and the principle of sustainability in UN General Assembly 
Resolution 69/319. These points of contact in the understanding of sustainability 
may play a role in gathering support for a proposal to include “inclusive economic 
growth and sustainable development” as part of a codified principle of sustainabil-
ity. Indeed, there is significance in going beyond a purely financial assessment of 
whether a State’s payment of its existing debts may lead to an unbounded accumula-
tion of future debts.
Fostering “inclusive economic growth” within the Debtor State should be seen as 
rational and viable strategy in SDR because it addresses the following characteris-
tics that is not found in domestic bankruptcy regimes:
1. Unlike corporations that are the subject of bankruptcy proceedings, there is no 
option of liquidation or dissolution of a Debtor State because the likelihood of 
such an event happening as result of a debt crisis is minimal. As such, the debt 
crisis is necessarily temporary. In most instances, the question to be addressed 
is not the survival of the State but the duration of the crisis given the measures 
that may be implemented to resolve it.
2. The assets of the Debtor State that may be used to service its debts are dynamic 
given a functioning economy that utilizes fiscal policies like raising revenue 
through taxation.
3. A distressed Debtor State is also accountable to its citizens who are beneficiar-
ies of its social welfare programs such as “pensioners, those depending on the 
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government for health benefits or education, etc.” ([27], p. 9). Guzman and 
Stiglitz have called these beneficiaries as the State’s informal creditors whose 
“benefits are part of the social contract” ([27], p. 9).
The lack of an option for “State dissolution” should shift an SDR framework 
towards economic growth rather than the common pool of assets (see [28]) prob-
lem in bankruptcy cases. This is a paradigm shift from a static understanding of a 
limited pool of assets in domestic bankruptcy proceedings to a dynamic one which 
accounts for the possibility of growth (or conversely, diminution) based on the 
macroeconomic conditions of the Debtor State. Thus, “inclusive economic growth” 
within the Debtor State shortens the duration of a sovereign debt crisis and expands 
the available pool of State assets that may be used to service its debts. The expansion 
of the State’s asset base also prevents the unbounded accumulation of future debts.
Such endogenous growth implies a multiplier effect in the economy that 
increases a Debtor State’s tax revenues, consumption, investments and expendi-
tures. In the context of SDR, “inclusive economic growth” ultimately means the 
increased likelihood of the Debtor State to pay its debts. In this way, it benefits 
everyone: the Debtor State, the creditors and other stakeholders especially those 
who derive benefit from the Debtor State’s social contract.
The project of fostering “inclusive economic growth” within the Debtor State 
would be seen in contradistinction to the imposition of austerity measures purport-
edly to set aside money to pay the State’s creditors. Guzman and Stiglitz observes 
that “austerity policies are normally counterproductive even from a creditors’ perspec-
tive” ([27], p. 8). Austerity measures may, in fact, decrease the State’s ability to pay 
its debts by preventing it from spending money domestically to fix its economy.
There is also a question of social justice involved in prioritizing foreign creditors 
over the Debtor State’s social welfare beneficiaries. Limited State assets are being 
used to pay wealthy investors (which include the so-called “vulture funds”) over the 
State’s citizens who may be invoking rights more closely related to value of human 
life—e.g. rights to public health and a sustainable environment. This arrangement in 
effect violates a hierarchy of values in international law which upholds the primacy 
of human life over property. Thus, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights issued 
a Resolution which “affirms that the exercise of the basic rights of the people of 
debtor countries to food, housing, clothing, employment, education, health ser-
vices and a healthy environment cannot be subordinated to the implementation of 
structural adjustment policies and economic reforms arising from the debt” [29].
The treaty codification of “inclusive economic growth and sustainable develop-
ment” as part of the principle of sustainability helps SDR move beyond a purely 
financial framework of sustainability. While it may be desirable to adopt more tar-
geted measures to improve the human rights situation in SDR, an emphasis on the 
Debtor State’s endogenous economic growth also addresses this aspect by improving 
the collective welfare of the relevant actors involved. In particular, an improved 
economic situation helps the Debtor State fulfill its social contract with its citizens 
through an increased ability to pay.
5. Conclusion
As shown above, there are not only efficiency and equity problems in the present 
regime of SDR but also fundamental questions of social justice. These problems 
are serious enough to be simply ignored. The literature in SDR reveals that there 
is hardly any dispute that reforms are needed to address these problems. There 
is dispute, however, in the kind of reforms needed in SDR which ranges from the 
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adoption of clauses in debt contracts (to maximize flexibility) to enacting a fixed 
framework similar to a domestic bankruptcy regime (to maximize uniformity and 
predictability). If anything, a pragmatic approach to reform in SDR would have to 
be between these two ends.
This paper’s proposal to establish a treaty-based normative framework in SDR 
seeks to bridge the flexibility in ex post negotiations and the uniformity in ex ante 
rules. This proposal is not as ambitious as it sounds. By broadly codifying the norms 
in UN General Assembly Resolution 69/319, the proposal follows the Incremental 
Approach for reforms in SDR in the way it is backward-looking, because it builds 
on existing “soft law” approaches and other mechanisms and practices in SDR (for 
instance, it recognizes the role of ad hoc negotiations); and forward-looking, because 
it hopes to set the ground for more concrete and effective SDR measures in the 
future. As a whole, the approach of the proposal is to complement and improve the 
current conflicts of law regime of SDR.
Despite the proposal’s declared strategy to accommodate the various positions 
of States, one thing that stands out is its call to codify the principle of sustainability 
that emphasizes “inclusive economic growth and sustainable development.” This 
comes from the recognition that the articulation and implementation of this prin-
ciple is a more effective way of undertaking SDR than a purely financial framework 
of preventing the State’s unbounded accumulation of debts. It is premised on the 
idea that while there are no systematized rules, SDR is nevertheless situated in 
an international order that upholds a complexus of norms which includes human 
rights. Thus, this proposal is a call for a movement from SDR’s current focus on the 
protection of debt markets to the broader economic, social and political context of 
the international order.
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